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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA
Fulton County Superior Court
*“EFILED***QW




as Executor of the Estate of Dennis L.
Johnson, and as Beneficiary ofthe
Nancy Johnson Family Trust,
SHANNON JOHNSON,as Beneficiary
of the Dennis Johnson Family Trust,
THE DENNIS AND NANCY
JOHNSON CHARITABLE
REMAINDER UNITRUST, THE





KEVIN TAYLOR,Individually, and as
Trustee of the Nancy Johnson Family
Trust, and Trustee of the Dennis
Johnson Family Trust, and NICOLE
TAYLOR,Individually, and as Trustee
of the Nancy Johnson Family Trust,








MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
This matter is before this Court on: Defendants’ Motion for Protective
Order, filed September 30, 2019 (the “Motion”); and Plaintiffs’ Response in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, filed November 4, 2019
(the “Response’’). Having considered the entire record, the Court findsas follows.
 
1. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case involves a dispute over the administration of various trusts and
related entities and the management ofa key trust asset—Welcome to Paradise,
LLC (“WTP”) which during the relevant period owned two pizza restaurants, the
Fire Stone Wood Fired Pizza and Grill in Dothan, Alabama and Woodstock,
Georgia. (See First Amended Verified Complaint (“Complaint”), §21.) Nancy
Johnson is the widow of Dennis Johnson andis the Executor ofhis Estate. (/d., 49
5, 7.) They have three children: non-party David Johnson; Plaintiff Shannon
Johnson; and Defendant Nicole Taylor who is married to Defendant Kevin Taylor.
Ud., Tf 1, 6.)
The Nancy Johnson Family Trust (“NJ Trust’) and the Dennis Johnson
Family Trust (“DJ Trust”) (collectively the “Trusts”) own WTP, with each Trust
holding a 50% ownership interest. (/d., 930.) Plaintiff Nancy Johnson is the
lifetime beneficiary of the NJ Trust while Plaintiff Shannon Johnson is a remainder
beneficiary of both Trusts along with her siblings, Nicole and David. (/d., 7] 31,
38.) Defendants Kevin and Nicole Taylor are former co-managers of WTP and
former co-trustees of the Trusts. (/d., J] 28-29, 31, 38.) Kevin and Nicole also
previously served as officers and managers of various related entities created as
part of Dennis and Nancy’s estate planning, including the Dennis and Nancy
Johnson Charitable Remainder Unitrust (“CRUT”), the Dennis L. and NancyS.
 
Johnson Family Foundation, Inc. (“Family Foundation”), and DNJ Investments,
LLC (“DNIJ”). (d., $F 12-19.)
Plaintiffs allege Defendants: refused to return documents and property
belonging to the CRUT, DNJ, and the Family Foundation despite having been
removed as officers/managers in April 2017 (/d., J] 16-19), failed and refused to
provide annual accountings of the Trusts and financial information about WTP
(Id., {§| 35-37, 45-46, 77-78, 97-98, 106-107, 112), misrepresented the financial
status of WTP to fraudulently induce Nancy Johnson to invest further in the
business (/d., {| 47-50), and unlawfully converted funds from WTPandthe Trusts
(d., 9 51-52, 56, 59-60, 66-71, 75-80, 83-84, 88), among other allegations of
misconduct.
Plaintiffs assert the following claims and requestsforrelief: (I) violations of
the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”); (ID)
equitable accounting and legal accounting of the NJ Trust and WTP;(III) equitable
accounting and legal accounting of the DJ Trust and WTP;(IV) breach oftrust and
removal of trustees; (V) breach of fiduciary duty; (VI) conversion/theft of WTP
profits and trust principal; (VID) conversion/theft of CRUT, DNJ and Family
Foundation’s corporate and trust property; (VIII) injunctive and other equitable
relief related to the CRUT, DNJ, and Family Foundation; (IX)injunctive and other
equitable relief related to the NJ Trust, DJ Trust, and WTP; (X)attorneys’ fees and
 
expenses of litigation; and (XI) punitive damages.
Between 2018 and 2019, the Court issued a number of discovery related
orders, ordering Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests. See
generally Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Extend Time to Respond to
Plaintiffs’ Discovery Requests, issued June 29, 2018; Order on Certain Discovery
Related Motions, Objections and Requests, issued December 21, 2018; and Order
on Discovery Dispute, issued February 21, 2019. Upon Defendants’ failure to
comply with the foregoing Orders, on April 2, 2019, the Court issued an Order
Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions. Therein the Court expressly found that
Defendants “ha[d] not engaged in discovery in good faith and ha[d] not complied
with the Court’s June 29, 2018, December 17 [sic], 2018, or February 21, 2019
Orders.” (April 2, 2019 Order, p. 16.) As a discovery sanction and pursuant to
O.C.G.A. §9-11-37(b)(2), the Court struck Defendants’ Verified Answer and
Counterclaims and found Defendants to be in default. (/d.)
Consequently, on September 12, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Entry of Default Judgment as to Liability Against Defendants. (September 12,
2019 Order.) The Court ordered “the entry of a default judgmentasto liability only
against Defendants onall claims asserted in Plaintiffs’ Complaint” but “[b]ecause
those claims involve unliquidated damages,” the Court directed that the case
proceed pursuant to the Court’s previous case management and scheduling orders.
 
(Id., p. 2.)
On September 30, 2019, Defendants filed the instant Motion, objecting to
discovery requests propounded by Plaintiffs on August 30, 2019 as improperly
seeking financial information that is irrelevant to the currently pending issue of
damages. Defendants contend the requested discovery would only be properin the
context of post-judgment discovery. Also on September 30, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a
Motion to Stay the Case Management Order’s Deadlines (the “Motion to Stay”). In
the Motion to Stay, Plaintiffs indicated they would be filing a Motion to Compel
given that Defendants stated at recent depositions they did not intend to fully
respond to Plaintiffs’ pending discovery requests and “refused to answer any
questions related to their personal finances either while managing [WTP], or
thereafter.” (Motion to Stay, p. 2.) Plaintiffs requested that the “Court stay the
deadlines in the Case Management Order until the Court has an opportunity to rule
on the Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, and the Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Compel.” (/d., pp. 2-3.) After expedited briefing, on October 4, 2019, the Court
granted Plaintiffs’ request to stay the case deadlines pending a ruling on
Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order and Plaintiffs’ anticipated Motion to
Compel. (October4, 2019 Order, p. 2.)
In the Response, Plaintiffs request the Court deny Defendant’s’ Motion and
order Defendants to fully respond to the discovery requestsor, alternatively, order
 
Defendants to respond to 31 requests “to which no objections apply.” (Response,p.
2.) Defendants did not reply to Plaintiffs’ Response. To date Plaintiffs have not
filed a Motion to Compel.
I. APPLICABLE STANDARDS
With respect to the general scope of discovery, O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(b)(1)
provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whetherit relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence...
(Emphasis added). See also Bowden v. The Med. Ctr., Inc., 297 Ga. 285, 291
(2015) (“[I]n the discovery context, courts should and ordinarily do interpret
‘relevant’ very broadly to mean any matter that is relevant to anything that is or
may becomean issuein litigation”) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,
437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal quotations omitted); Sechler Family P’shipv.
Prime Grp., Inc., 255 Ga. App. 854, 859 (2002) (“The discovery procedure is to be
given a liberal construction in favor of supplying a party with the facts without
 
reference to whether the facts sought are admissible upon thetrial of the action”)
(quoting Clayton Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Lake Spivey Golf Club, Inc., 207
Ga. App. 693, 695 (1993)).
0.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c) generally governs the entry of protective orders and
authorizes courts to “make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”
O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c). “The issuance of a protective order is a recognition of the
fact that in some circumstances the interest in gathering information must yield to
the interest in protecting a party.” Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia v.
Ambati, 299 Ga. App. 804, 811 (2009) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, protective
orders should not be used as a meansto hinderlegitimate discovery and the burden
is on the movant to show “good cause” for its entry. O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c). As
summarized by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga.
App. 852 (2017):
“O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(c) does establish a general statutory basis
for the entry of protective orders limiting or curtailing
discovery under appropriate circumstances, provided such
limitations do not have the effect of frustrating and preventing
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legitimate discovery.” Christopher v. State of Ga., 185 Ga. App.
532, 533, 364 S.E.2d 905 (1988) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Such protective orders, which are within the
discretion ofthe trial judge, “are intended to be protective—not
prohibitive—and, until such time as the courtis satisfied by
substantial evidence that bad faith or harassment motivates
the discoveror’s [sic] action, the court should not intervene
 
to limit or prohibit the scope of pretrial discovery.” Bullard
yv. Ewing, 158 Ga. App. 287, 291, 279 S.E.2d 737 (1981).
Caldwell, 341 Ga. App. at 861 (no error in denying protective orders where
movants failed to show that bad faith or harassment motivated the party seeking
the depositions or what specific prejudice might result from the depositions)
(emphasis added). See Galbreath_v. Braley, 318 Ga. App. 111, 113 (2012)
(“[P]rotective orders should not be awarded ‘when the effect is to frustrate and
prevent legitimate discovery’”) (citing International Svc. Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 130
Ga. App. 140, 144 (1973)). Good cause which needs to be shownfora protective
order must be clearly demonstrated in the factual record and “is not established by
stereotyped or conclusional statements, bereft of facts.” Young v. Jones, 149 Ga.
App. 819, 824 (1979).
Hf. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
In the Motion, Defendants ask the Court to issue a protective order finding
Defendants are not obligated to “offer further responses” to Plaintiffs’ discovery
requests propounded on August 30, 2019. (Motion, p. 8.) Specifically, Plaintiffs’
discovery requests propounded August 30, 2019 include: Plaintiff Shannon
Johnson’s First Continuing Interrogatories propounded separately upon Defendant
Kevin Taylor and Defendant Nicole Taylor (collectively ‘Plaintiffs’
Interrogatories”) and Plaintiffs Nancy Johnson and Shannon Johnson’s Second
Continuing Request for Production of Documents propounded separately upon
 
Defendant Kevin Taylor and Defendant Nicole Taylor (collectively ‘Plaintiffs’
RPDs”). (Motion,p. 1.)
Relevant to the current dispute, on March 29, 2019, Plaintiffs propounded
discovery requests upon Defendants expressly titled “First Post Judgment
Continuing Request for Production of Documents” and “First Post Judgment
Continuing Interrogatories”(collectively “Post Judgment Discovery”).' On May1,
2019, Defendants moved for a protective order, challenging the “Post Judgment”
discovery requests as improper in light of the posture of the case and given that
Plaintiffs do not possess a judgment for actual damages. However, on May 10,
2019, Defendants filed a notice of withdrawalof that motion, stating inter alia that
counsel had “consulted and clarified this issue” and that the motion was “moot.”
(May 10, 2019 Defendants’ Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Protective Order,
$1 2-3.)
! Thus,Plaintiffs propounded this Post Judgment Discovery after the Court orally granted Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Sanctions from the bench at a March 21, 2019 hearing on the motion but before the Court issued its April 2,
2019 written order striking Defendants’ Verified Answer and Counterclaimand before it issued its September 12,
2019 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default Judgmentas to Liability.
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In their current Motion, Defendants assert that, although titled differently,
Plaintiffs’ current discovery requests are substantially similar to the previously
withdrawn Post Judgment Discovery and are likewise improper given that
Plaintiffs have a default judgment as to liability only and do not yet possess a
 
judgment for actual damages. (Motion, p. 2.) According to Defendants, Plaintiffs’
discovery requests seek financial information from Defendants “as a way of
ascertaining how they can satisfy any future monetary damages they may be
awarded”after a damages and equitablerelieftrial is held. (/d., p. 3.)
Notably, Defendants generally assert all of Plaintiffs’ August 30, 2019
discovery requests are “wholly outside the proper scope of discovery forthis
action.” (/d., p. 6.) Defendants ask that the Court issue a protective order stating,
inter alia, that all such requests “are inappropriate at this time” and that
“Defendants are not obligated to offerfurther responses to Plaintiff's [sic] August
30, 2019 Discovery requests.” (/d., p. 8 (emphasis added).) However,it is unclear
from the record what, if any, response Defendants made to Plaintiffs’
Interrogatories and Plaintiffs’ RPDs. Thus, the Court’s review is limited to
Plaintiffs’ discovery requests as propounded on August 30, 2019 and referenced in
the Motion.
Defendants’ Motion specifically references only four RPDs and three
interrogatories:
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Plaintiffs’ RPD No. 1: [Produce] [a]ny and all monthly bank
statements for all accounts including checking and savings
accounts with any banks, savings and loans, credit unions,
money markets, brokerage firms or other financial institutions
maintained by the Defendant, either individually and/orjointly
with any other person or entity for the period of October 21,
2011 to the present.
 
Plaintiffs’ RPD No. 4: [Produce] [a]ny and all records,
documents, memoranda and correspondence, which evidence or
relate to the ownership of any motor vehicles by the Defendant,
including but not limited to, automobile tag registrations,
certificates, automobile title certificates, and/or recreational
vehicle tag registrations, titles or certificates, naming Judgment
Debtor, individually or jointly with any other person or entity,
for the period of October 21, 2011 to the present.
Plaintiffs’ RPD No. 8: [Produce] [a]ny and all records,
documents, memoranda and correspondence relating to any
financial statements or net worth statements for the period of
October 21, 2011 to the present, including but not limited to
those submitted by the Defendant to any bank, lending
institution or any otherentity.
Plaintiffs’ RPD No. 10: [Produce] [a]ny and all statements,
documents, analysis, invoices, bills or summaries given to
Judgment Debtor by any stockbroker or association of
stockbrokers, from whom the Defendant has bought stock, or to
whom Judgment Debtor has sold stock, or with whom the
Defendant has an account for the period of October 21, 2011 to
the present.
Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 1: If anyone owes you any
money, state the name and address of each such debtor; the
amount owed; the form ofthe obligation; the date the obligation
was incurred; the date the obligation becomes or became, due
and owing; the condition for payment ofthe obligation, if any,
and the consideration given for the obligation.
Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 3: If you own any other personal
Il
property not referred to above, give a complete description of
same; the present location of the property; the estimated present
value of the property; and the name and address of each other
person with an ownership interest in the property.
Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 10: If you own anysecurities,
including stocks, bonds, debentures, or mortgages, for each
purchasestate the type and numberofthe securities owned; the
name of the issuing entity; the date of purchase; the total
purchase price; the name and address of the broker through
whom you made the purchase; and the name and address of
each person with an ownership interest in such security as a
result of the purchase.
(Motion, Ex. 2.) Although the Motion only specifically addresses the foregoing
‘requests, in a footnote Defendants assert these discovery requests “were
highlighted as a way to demonstrate that all of the requests are outside of the
proper scope of discovery for this action as they [sic] irrelevant and impertinent.”
Ud., p. 8 n. 1.)
Having considered the entire record, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ RPDs and
Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories generally seek discoverable information. Importantly, the
striking of Defendants’ Verified Answer and Counterclaim and subsequent entry of
default judgment against Defendants serves as an admission ofall well-pled
allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
[A] defendant in default is in the position of having admitted
each and every material allegation of the plaintiff's petition
except as to the amount of damages alleged. The default
concludes the defendant's liability, and estops him from
offering any defenses which would defeat the right of recovery.
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Fink v. Dodd, 286 Ga. App. 363, 364 (2007) (quoting Cohran v. Carlin, 254 Ga.
580, 585 (1985). See also Azarat Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Department of Admin.
Affairs, 245 Ga. App. 256, 257 (2000) (“[T]he default operates to admit only the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint and the fair inferences and conclusions
of fact to be drawn therefrom’) (quoting Weldon v. Williams, 170 Ga. App. 589,
591 (1984)).
Here, Defendants have been held liable as to all claims asserted in the
Complaint (counts I-XT), and they are deemed to have admitted numerousfactual
allegations that inform the scope of relevant discovery during the current damages
phase ofthis litigation. For example, Defendants have admitted:
e “[F]rom approximately 2015 until 2016, the Defendants fraudulently
induced Nancy Johnson to use the moneythat she received from the sale of
the Glen Eagles Home, and from her monthly social security payments, to
pay for the Taylors’ child care expenses on a monthly basis in the amount of
approximately $1,600 per month by the Taylors claiming that they spent a
significant amount of time running WTP,sacrificed their own careers for
WTP,and were not making any money running WTP.” (Complaint, 950.)
e “Over the course of 2016 and 2017, Nancy and Shannon Johnson have
discovered that the Taylors’ infusion of cash into Welcometo Paradise from
the NJ and DJ Trusts, and from Nancy Johnson, were for the sole purpose of
converting those funds to the Taylors.” (/d., 451.)
e “[T]he Plaintiffs learned in 2016 that since 2012, Kevin and Nicole Taylor
have been paying themselves increasing salaries over the years while at the
same time advising the Plaintiffs that the restaurants were about to go out of
business.” (/d., 956.)
e “Despite the fact that Kevin and Nicole Taylor were paid ever increasing
salaries to manage WTP,from in or about 2012 to present, Kevin and Nicole
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Taylor have hired third party managers to manage WTP and perform their
same functions, resulting in WTP paying double management fees to both
the Taylors and to third party managers. Second, upon information and
belief, Kevin and Nicole Taylor are paying themselves through third party
entities which have entered into contractual relationships with WTP. These
entities include, but are not limited to: Dothan Guest Management Holdings,
LLC (“DGMH”), Eastbeck Wealth Management, LLC (“Eastbeck”), Taylor
& Company Realty, LLC, and Golden Grain Media, LLC.”(d., 4¥ 59-60.)
“In March 2016, the Plaintiffs discovered that in February 2016 the Taylors
wrote themselves checks from a WTP bank account in the amount of
approximately $1,700 made out to ‘cash’, and with subject lines that read
‘petty cash’ during the month, and then at the end of the month ‘negative
deposit’, clearly draining any net profits from WTP in cash at the end of the
month.” (/d., 68.)
“[T]he Taylors use the WTP bankcard for their personal expenses. In March
2016, the Plaintiffs discovered that in February 2016 the Taylors’ used WTP
bank cards for purchases at stores such as Tommy Bahamas, Ruth’s Chris
Steakhouse, and Massage Envy, to name a few,in the total amount for the
month of February 2016 of approximately $9,000 in personal expenditures
for dining out, clothes, shoes, and massages.” (/d., J 69-70.)
“Based on this discovery in March 2016, Nancy and Shannon Johnson
believe that the Defendants’ theft has occurred in all months that they have
operated WTP since 2012, however, the Defendants have prevented them
from obtaining bank statements, which refusal has necessitated this filing.”
(d., 71.)
“Continuing since 2012, Kevin and Nicole Taylor have told Nancy Johnson
that WTPis a failing business and could go out of business at any moment,
thus subjecting her to the approximately $1,000,000 lease liability on the
Woodstock location... However, after Nancy Johnson discovered the WTP
bank statements for February 2016 showing the theft outlined above, she
retained counsel and began asking the Taylors for more information, andit
wasat that point that the Taylors began a barrage oftactics aimed at keeping
Nancy and Shannon Johnson from discovering the true amount ofthe theft.
When Nancy Johnson asked for the keys to the Dothan restaurant that she
ownsthrough South Oates, the Taylors refused. When Nancy Johnson asked
for Quickbooks and other backup to the WTPfinancials, the Taylors refused.
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Instead, Kevin and Nicole Taylor threatened Nancy Johnsonbystating that
if Nancy Johnson filed a lawsuit to attempt to obtain the backup documents,
they would close the business and she would be subject to the $1,000,000
liability because WTP could not afford to pay attorney’s fees.” (/d., 4¥ 72,
75-78.)
“Through the above-referenced activities, the Defendants formed an
association-in-fact whereby they acted individually and in concert with one
another through the Enterprise known as [WTP], to steal money on a
continuing, monthly basis and to prevent the Defendants from discovering
the theft in order to retain the profits and benefits that flowed from [WTP]
and the NJ and the DJ Trust for themselvesto the exclusion of their intended
beneficiaries.” (/d., 484.)
“The Defendants fraudulently induced Nancy Johnson to sell her home by
fraudulently stating to her that selling the homeandinvesting the funds into
WTP wasthe only way to keep the WTP restaurants open and avoid the $1
Million lease liability when in fact, Nancy Johnson learned in 2016 that the
restaurants were not insolvent and the funds were not needed to the keep the
restaurants open.” (/d., 188.)
“.,.Kevin and Nicole Taylor as the Board of Managers of WTP,the Trustees
of the NJ Trust, and the individuals who have exerted complete control over
WTP, have failed and refused to provide Nancy Johnson with any back up
information or financial information related to WTP beyondtax returns and
financials. Moreover, Kevin and Nicole Taylor, as Trustees of the NJ Trust,
have failed and refused to provide Nancy Johnson with an accounting of
either the NJ Trust or WTP.” (d., §] 97-98.)
“Kevin and Nicole Taylor as the Board of Managers of WTP,the Trustees of
the DJ Trust, and the individuals who have exerted complete control over
WTP, havefailed and refused to provide Shannon Johnson with any back up
informationor financial information related to WTP beyondtax returns and
financials. Kevin and Nicole Taylor have also failed and refused to provide
Shannon Johnson with specific information requested related to the DJ
Trust...kevin and Nicole Taylor have failed and refused to provide
complete accountings to Shannon Johnson either at her request or on an
annualbasis.” (/d., {| 106-107, 112.)
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e “Uponinformation and belief, Kevin and Nicole Taylor have converted and
misappropriated the money in the DJ and NJ Trusts for their own use and
enjoymentby first distributing it to WTP to pay for purported losses, and
then paying themselves exorbitant expenses, salaries, and fees through third
party entities owned by Kevin and Nicole Taylor...Upon information and
belief, Kevin and Nicole Taylor have converted and misappropriated the
WTP profits belonging to the NJ and DJ Trusts, and thus, the Trusts’
 
beneficiaries, to themselves...Nancy and Shannon Johnson have demanded
that Kevin and Nicole Taylor return the money and property
converted/stolen, and Kevin and Nicole Taylor have refused.” (/d., JJ 128-
129, 131.)
e “Kevin and Nicole Taylor have converted and are refusing to turn over
property in their possession related to the CRUT, DNJ, and the Family
Foundation...The CRUT, DNJ, and the Family Foundation have demanded
that Kevin and Nicole Taylor return the property converted/stolen, and
Kevin and Nicole Taylor have refused.” (/d., {J 136, 139.)
Thus, Defendants have admitted that during the time they acted as managers
of WTP andas trustees of the Trusts, they fraudulently induced Nancy Johnson to
invest further in the business and then improperly tooksalaries, expenses, cash and
wire transfers to which they were not entitled. They also refused to provide
Plaintiffs with complete financial information related to WTP and the Trusts in an
effort to actively conceal the theft. In order to establish the proper measure of
damages flowing from Defendants’ admitted conduct, Plaintiffs must identify and
quantify the impropertransfers made to Defendants andtheiraffiliated entities.
Further, Defendants have been found liable for breach of trust (count IV).
O.C.G.A. §53-12-301, which governs such claims, provides that “[i]f a trustee
commits a breachoftrust...a beneficiary shall have a cause ofaction to seek:...[t]o
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recover damages; [and] [t]o compel the trustee to redress a breach oftrust by
payment of money or otherwise...” O.C.G.A. §53-12-301(a)(1),(5). Further,
“{w]hen trust assets are misapplied and can be traced in the hands of persons
affected with notice of the misapplication, the trust shall attach to such assets. A
 
creditor of a trust may follow assets in the hands of beneficiaries even if they were
received without notice.” O.C.G.A. §53-12-301(b). Given the remedies available
on the breach oftrust claim, Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery regarding not only
how much money was improperly taken but also what Defendants did with those
funds.
Moreover, Plaintiffs seek an award of punitive damages. (Complaint, J 92,
154.)
Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in
which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud,
wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which
would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to
consequences...Punitive damages shall be awarded not as
compensation to a plaintiff but solely to punish, penalize, or
deter a defendant...If it is found that punitive damagesare to be
awarded, the trial shall immediately be recommenced in order
to receive such evidenceasis relevant to a decision regarding
what amount of damageswill be sufficient to deter, penalize, or
punish the defendant in light of the circumstancesofthe case.
O.C.G.A. §51-12-5.1(b), (c), (d)(2).
“Tf a plaintiff seeks punitive damages, evidence of the defendant's financial
circumstances may be admissible.” Dagne v. Schroeder, 336 Ga. App. 36, 41
17
(2016) (citing Holland v. Caviness, 292 Ga. 332, 335 (2013)). However, in orderto
discover information pre-trial concerning the defendant’s personal financial
resources, a plaintiff must make an “evidentiary showing (byaffidavit, discovery
responses, or otherwise) that a factual basis exist[s] for [the] punitive damage
 
claim.” Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, 293 Ga. App. 153, 168 (2008);
 
Neal Pope, Inc. v. Garlington, 245 Ga. App. 49, 54 (2000); Holman v. Burgess,
199 Ga. App. 61, 63 (1991). Here, in light of the default judgment entered against
Defendants on counts I through XI as well as Defendants’ factual admissions as
discussed above, the Court finds the requisite evidentiary showing has been made
2and inquiry into Defendants’ “financial circumstances” at this juncture is
appropriate.
It follows that inquiry into Defendants’ personal finances, including their
assets and liabilities, is relevant to the issue of damages (direct, consequential and
punitive), and is within the scope of permissible discovery during this phase of the
litigation. Although Plaintiffs and/or the newly appointedtrustee of the Trusts may
be in possession ofcertain records responsive to the requested discovery, such does
not relieve Defendants of their obligation to produce responsive records and
information in their custody, possession, or control. This is particularly true in light
of the numerous discovery issues in this case and the general obfuscation of
discovery by Defendants, chronicled in numerousorders of this Court, which call
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into question the accuracy and completeness of the financial records of WTP and
the Trusts. Defendants also do not specify any particular documents in Plaintiffs’
possession or controlthat are fully responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests such
that requiring Defendants to respond to the discovery would be unnecessarily
 
duplicative and burdensome. Ultimately Defendants have not made the requisite
showing by “substantial evidence that bad faith or harassment motivates
[Plaintiffs’ discovery requests]” such as is necessary for issuance of the requested
protective order. Caldwell, 341 Ga. App. at 861.
“Nevertheless, even ‘where pre-trial discovery of the defendant's financial
resources is authorized, the scope of such should be restricted to the extent
necessary to prevent an unreasonable intrusion into the defendant's privacy.””
Smith, 293 Ga. App. at 169 (quoting Holman, 199 Ga. App. at 63-64). Having
reviewed Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, the Court finds Interrogatory No. 3 is
overbroad. Accordingly, the Court narrowsthis interrogatory as set forth below:
e Interrogatory No. 3: If you own any other personal property not referred to
above with an individual present value of $500.00 or more, give a complete
description of same; the present location of the property; the estimated
present value of the property; and the name and address of each other person
with an ownership interest in the property.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having considered the entire record and given all of the above, Defendants’
Motion for Protective Order is DENIED. Defendants are ORDEREDto respond
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to Interrogatory No. 3 as narrowed above and otherwise shall respond fully to
Plaintiffs’ RPDs and Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories, all within ten (10) days of this
order. See O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c) (“If [a] motion for a protective order is denied in
whole or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that
 
any party or person provide or permit discovery’). The Court will defer
consideration of Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in
responding to Defendants’ Motion until the damages hearing/trial at which time the
parties may present argument and/or evidence regarding same.
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SO ORDEREDthis, the day of January, 2020.
asKELLY LEE ELLERBE
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